There are new developments within biology and these have implications for political science generally and the study of biology and politics more narrowly. This paper will look at four case studies: (a) individual selection versus other models; (b); the roots of altruism and their political implications (c) the role of genes in politics; (d) neuroimaging and politics. There is considerable debate within each of these issues, and this paper will simply note the implications of such debates for the study of politics.
Introduction
Looking to the future, we see a number of issues that will doubtless generate controversy regarding the intertwining of issues from the life sciences with the study of politics. We explore four of these possibilities to illustrate. We will briefly describe each and then the implications for biopolitical discourse.
Since Darwin and Russell's presentation of evolutionary theory, there has been discussion involving the level at which evolution operates-from the individual level to the group level. Currently, there is ongoing discussion about multi-level evolution. From the 1960s on, the emphasis has been on individual level selection, functioning as a sort of scientific orthodoxy. In more recent years, group selection has been examined more closely as a part of the explanation of evolutionary change. This paper discusses the nature of the debate and its implications.
Three other areas are discussed as well-genes and twin studies as one element in the explanation of political attitudes and behavior, the roots of cooperation and altruism in evolutionary theory, and-finally-the place of neuroimaging as a tool in explaining the brain's role in political orientations and behavior.
Group versus Individual Selection
It had been widely accepted that natural selection operates at the individual rather than the group level. When Wynne-Edwards (1962) authored a work using group selection to explain behavior, controversy developed. Responses to the group selection perspective were prompt. George Williams (1966) was in the forefront, locating the level of selection with the individual.
Gradually, an orthodoxy of individual level selection developed. The logic was straightforward. Darwin's theory was based on two simple propositions: first, there is variation among creatures within any species; second, some of the variations provide survival advantage for those individuals who have them and, hence, will be selected for. Natural selection is the process by which nature selects those individuals whose characteristics are best fit for survival in their environments. Individuals whose characteristics do not fit an environment quite so well will tend to die off before reproducing or reproduce less successfully.
Those characteristics that fit the environment and confer some survival value for the organism are termed "adaptations." Those organisms best adapted to their environments are more likely to survive and to reproduce. In that sense, and in that sense alone, they are more "fit" (e.g., see Williams, 1966) . Those of their offspring who inherit those adaptations are, in turn, themselves more likely to survive and reproduce. Over time, individuals within a species develop adaptations that make them increasingly more apt to enjoy reproductive success and those adaptations consequently become dominant or widespread within the species.
An important step in applying evolutionary theory to human social behavior was taken by sociobiology, the study of the evolutionary bases of social behavior (Dawkins, 1976; Trivers, 1971; Wilson, 1975) . A key concept for sociobiology is "inclusive fitness," the premise that evolution inclines living organisms to those modes of behavior most likely to maximize the number of their genes transmitted to the next generation. This can be done in two different ways: first, by passing along their genes directly, usually referred as individual reproductive success; second, by furthering the reproductive success of their relatives, with whom they share genes. The combination of these two is termed "inclusive fitness," which encompasses both the reproductive success of an individual and of that individual's relatives with whom, depending upon the degree of relatedness, the individual shares more or fewer genes (see Barash, 1982; Dawkins, 1976 , Wilson, 1975 . Thus stated, the individual is the focal point of evolution and natural selection.
Are there political implications to this argument? Peter Corning's book The Fair Society illustrates (Corning, 2011) . In this work, Corning argues for a fair society, in which social justice is done. At one point, he observes that (2011, p. 66): ". . .group selection between socially organized and closely cooperating groups seems likely to have provided a favorable selection regime for the emergence of our unique wardrobe of social and moral traits." Among these: identification with our "group"; an eagerness to fit in with social norms; concern for the wellbeing of our particular group; a willingness to be altruistic and to support a sense of justice and fairness. The result of these effects could facilitate the development of a just society. Thus, one's position on the group selection debate carries implications for our understanding of human societies.
Group-level or multi-level evolution has reemerged as an issue and has produced new debate. The disagreement between E. O. Wilson and Richard Dawkins illustrates. And, as the example above testifies, there are political and policy implications as to the outcome of the controversy.
Wilson says that group selection was quite prominent in human evolution from 50,000 to 60,000 years ago. In his words (2012, p. 91):
Bands and communities of bands with better combinations of cultural innovations became more productive and better equipped for competition and war. Their rivals either copied them or else were displaced and their territories taken. Thus group selection drove the evolution of culture. A key concept in Wilson's book is "eusociality," which refers to (2012, p. 17) "group members containing multiple generations and prone to perform altruistic acts as part of their division of labor." He notes that humans and a number of social insects manifest this trait. Eusocial behavior is a product of both individual and group selection; since more eusocial groups would be likelier to survive, this introduces an element of group selection to the process.
On the other hand, Steven Pinker objects to Wilson's analysis. Pinker argues, using standard evolutionary theory (2012, p. 3):
The theory of natural selection applies most readily to genes because they have the right stuff to drive selection, namely making high-fidelity copies of themselves. Granted, it's often convenient to speak about selection at the level of individuals, because it's the fate of individuals (and their kin) in the world of cause and effect which determines the fate of their genes. Furthermore, he notes that many illustrations of group selection are cultural rather than genetic in nature (e.g., note Wilson's statement earlier). Dawkins (2012) is highly critical of Wilson's thesis as well.
Genes, Twin Studies, and Politics
An emerging area in political analysis speaks to the effects of genes on political behavior. A number of students of human behavior have addressed this. Two distinct approaches have emerged. First, there is the use of data on molecular genetics as these are associated with sociopolitical behavior. Second, the use of twin studies to assess how much impact genes have on political attitudes and behaviors. We summarize illustrative research for both approaches and also note some of the ongoing debates about these two perspectives.
Molecular genetics and politics. What do we mean by this? Boisvert and Vaske note that (2011:168) : "Molecular genetics is the study of gene functioning and how individual differences in gene functioning affect one's health, cognitions, and behavior." The same gene may be coded differently on a chromosome across individual organisms (allele is the term to describe two or more versions of a gene at a particular locus). Data bases have been developed that record individuals' genes for certain characteristics. Some of these databases have featured research which asks subjects about their sociopolitical attitudes and behaviors. Thus, a statistical analysis of the relationship between genes, on the one hand, and political attitudes and behavior, on the other, can be developed.
Let us begin with applications and then examine the controversy over the impact of genes on behavior. Settle, Dawes, Christakis, and Fowler (2010) use data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health to examine effects of an allele (DRD4) on political ideology, considering a moderating effect of friendship on the association. The specific gene is the 7R variant of the dopamine receptor D4 gene (DRD4). 62% of the sample (N=2,574 individuals) had no 7R variant; 33% had one copy; 5% had two copies. The reader should recall their genetics lessons-each person has two copies of each gene-one from the mother and the other from the father. Thus, there would be three options in this instance-no expression of an allele, an expression of one allele, or an expression of two.
Results? The dependent variable was ideology; the independent variable was the DRD4 gene. In addition, a measure of the number of friendships individuals reported was used. Number of friendships helps shape a relationship between gene and ideology. For those with the 7R variant of the allele, number of fri3ndships was strongly associated with liberalism. Without the 7R allele, there was no association between friendships and ideology. Dawes and Fowler (2009) use the same data base to explore the relationship between genes and political party identification and voting. In this instance, they explore the effects of the A2 dopamine receptor gene variation of the DRD2 gene. One could have no A2 alleles, one, or two (as per above discussion). The odds of identifying with a party are 1.2 times greater for a person with one allele as compared to someone with none. Just so, an individual with two A2 alleles has 1.4 times the likelihood of being partisan compared to a person with none. Finally, through the effects of the allele on partisanship, there is an indirect effect on voting, as those who are partisans are more likely to vote.
A final example. found that there was a gene-environment interaction affecting likelihood of voting. Persons in the sample (with information on genes as well as social and political behavior) who exhibited the long version of 5hTT and who participated in religious activities were 1.58 times more likely to vote. Those with that gene who did NOT participate in religious activities were no more likely to vote than those without the long version.
Questions have arisen about this method. At one level, as Charney and English (2012, 2013) note, complex behaviors are often affected by many different genes; at the same time a single gene may well be affecting numerous distinct characteristics. They note that over 266 genes are involved in the expression of aggression in fruit flies (Charney and English, 2012: 13) . Human sociopolitical behavior is more complex still, so identifying a single gene or two genes that have major roles to play seems overstated. Table 2 of their 2012 article (on pages 15-29) displays the remarkable range of characteristics effected by four genes (two of which are at the heart of Dawes' and Fowler's work)-from academic achievement in high school and age at first intercourse to startle response to Tourette Syndrome and to voting behavior. Since these genes affect so many behaviors and since, probably, many of the characteristics are affected by a multitude of other genes, research indicating the influence of two genes (2012: 30) ". . .is incompatible with the expectation that two genes could predict voter turnout."
Twin studies and politics. Determining the proportion of any characteristic that has a genetic component has commonly been assessed by the A+C+E model. A stands for the additive genetic component of a characteristic; C refers to common environmental factors; E equates to unique environmental components. The sum of A+C+E components is 1.0. The standard statistical technique used is structural equation modeling (SEM), although some argue that regression suffices (e.g., Smith and Hatemi, 2012) .
The model does not provide for observing environmental and genetic effects directly; however, the effects of these components can be estimated by considering the covariance between different types of twins-identical twins (MZ or monozygotic twins) versus fraternal twins (DZ or dizygotic). One key element in this endeavor is the reality that DZ twins share 50% of their genes whereas MZ twins share 100%. Based on this, variations in characteristics can be apportioned into A, C, and E. One can also further break down models into fewer than three factors, such as AE or AC models, etc. (For a nice discussion, see pages 365-367 in Loewen and Dawes, 2012; Littvay, 2011; Boisvert and Vaske, 2011) . Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) used twin studies data (the Virginia 30K, or VA30K, for short, and an Australian study) and found that there was a relationship between genetics and political orientations. In short, identical twins (monozygotic) were more similar in their political ideology and a variety of political attitudes than were nonidentical twins (dizygotic). The political metrics were limiting, in that they represented a strange set of variables, not using standard political science measures (e.g., some measures used: agreement or disagreement with statements about property tax, women's liberation, X-rated movies, modern art, astrology, the draft, etc.). The results, though, are indicative of a genetic component to the dependent variables. Overall, about 1/3 of the variation in political attitudes is due to genes. The results, the authors conclude, suggest a strong genetic component to the dependent variables (and see Hibbing, Smith, and Rice, 2013) . Fowler, Baker, and Dawes (2008) used the Southern California Twin Registry to ascertain the effect of genes on political participation. The measure of participation was a person's actual voter registration-not their own self-report of being registered. This datum was then examined using the ACE model. The result? About 53% of the variation in registration was explained by the genetic component; the shared environment accounted for about 35% and the unshared environment 12%. The authors also used the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. The dependent variables in this data set is self-report of having voted in the most recent presidential election and an index of political participation based on responses to questions regarding involvement in political activities. 72% of voting turnout was explained by genetics; genes explained 60% of the variation in the participation index. Clearly, heritability of these political behaviors is high (For a cross-cultural study, see Klemmensen et al., 2012) .
Some critics have argued that limiting these genetic analyses to twins is a problem. The argument is that the environments of MZ and DZ twins are assumed to be the same. If this is inaccurate, then the analysis of genetic effects on political orientations becomes questionable. Hatemi et al. (2010) address this by including non-twin siblings into the analysis. Their approach is to (page 801) ". . .include data on nontwin siblings, thereby allowing the model to partition variance separately for siblings generally and for twin siblings specifically." They use the VA30K data to assess this. They examine heritability of a wide array of variables (as per Alford, Hibbing, and Smith, 2005) and compare scores among nontwins, DZ twins, MZ twins, and parent-offspring. Within each sibling category, they examine male-male, female-female, and male-female heritability. With parent-offspring, they break down by Mother-son, Fatherdaughter, and Father-son. Overall, MZ twins have the highest scores with DZ twins, nontwin siblings and parent-offspring at a substantially lower level. The effect of genetics appears to be highlighted more here than with DZ versus MZ comparisons. Only a handful of comparisons for the twin-specific environment are statistically significant, indicating that the unique environment of twins is not shaping scores.
However, there is disagreement over the methods and uses of genetic research in political science. Several chapters in a recently published edited volume make this apparent (Peterson and Somit, 2011; for a nice survey of literature in which political scientists explore the consequences of genes, see Hannagan, 2011) .
Significant methodological issues have been discussed, such as some of the assumptions in using structural equation modeling (SEM) to explore the extent to which genes affect antisocial behavior. For instance, one approach assumes that there are no gene-environment interactions (a dubious proposition). Another assumption: There is no assortative mating (which assumes that likes tend to marry and reproduce with likes) (e.g., Boisvert and Vaske, 2011) .
There are also some other issues here. Littvay (2011) explores a number of methodological issues related to the use of SEM. One of these is measurement error. He contends that measurement error is not so easy to address. There is a downward bias with two of the three factors commonly used in analysis-additive genetic and common environmental effects. On the other hand, there is an upward bias in the impact of the unique environment (key components of the ACE model).
Finally, Charney (2011) points out that the general approach to twin studies has its roots in the early twentieth century. And the understanding of genes has often not changed among those using twin studies. In fact, of course, our understanding of genes has changed considerably since that time. As a result, questions arise about the use of current models, such as ACE) in assessing the impact of genes.
Evolution, Cooperation, and Altruism
The evolution of cooperation is another important issue in evolutionary theory. Cooperation, as Nowak defines it, in terms of individuals involved (2006:1560): "A cooperator is someone who pays a cost, c, for another individual to receive a benefit, b. A defector has no cost and does not deal out benefits." In evolutionary terms, how can cooperation serve the survival interests (and reproductive success) of individuals and, perhaps, groups? There is a robust literature on this subject. Nowak describes five perspectives that can help explain the development of altruism or cooperation (and see Nowak with Highfield, 2011; Nowak and Coakley, 2013) .
Kin selection. The first explanation is termed "kin selection." Altruism is one type of behavior in which sociobiologists display special interest. Sociobiologist Edward Wilson defines it as (Wilson, 1975: 578 . And see also Dugatkin, 1997; Buss, 1999; Barrett, Dunbar, and Lycett, 2002) : "Self-destructive behavior performed for the benefit of others." Why would this serve reproductive success purposes for the individuals who endanger themselves? If the individuals saved by the altruist were relatives, they share a specified proportion of genes. Therefore, if the risk of death of one animal ensures the survival of enough others with similar genes, the altruistic act may actually increase reproductive success of one's genes, although personal reproductive success might be lowered.
The specifics of the operation? For kin selection to lead to altruistic behavior, the sacrifice of an animal would have to save two or more of the altruist's siblings or offspring (since each shares one-half of the altruist's genes and, therefore, the total number of the altruist's genes represented in the next generation would be equal to or greater than the number in the present one). If the relatives were more distant, then the altruist would have to save correspondingly more to justify the sacrifice in terms of inclusive fitness, since there would be fewer genes in common. For example, one would have to save at least eight first cousins just to "break even," since an individual shares 1/8 of his or her genes with a first cousin. If the altruist is past reproductive age, even saving one relative by self-sacrifice is useful, since the altruist could no longer reproduce his or her genes directly. At this point in life, any effect such an altruist would have on increasing some of its genes in the next generation is pure "gravy."
To understand the logic of kin selection, one must continually keep in mind that natural selection and the entire evolutionary process involve leaving viable offspring which themselves reproduce. If one's sacrifice increases the survival chances of offspring (or other close relatives), then this behavior could be advantageous for one's genes' survival and thus be incorporated into future generations' genetically influenced behavioral repertoires.
Direct Reciprocity. There is another explanation of altruism and cooperative behavior as well (see the classic statement in Trivers, 1971) . Not all cooperative behavior is aimed at relatives, as with kin selection. How might one explain this? Nowak described a second mechanism for cooperation as "direct reciprocity." As Nowak say (2006 : 1560 : "Assume that there are repeated encounters between the same two individuals. In every round, each player has a choice between cooperation and defection. If I cooperate now, you may cooperate later. Hence, it might pay off to cooperate." Self-interest, then, can underlie cooperative behavior. You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours. Robert Axelrod illustrates how cooperation could become common in a population through the tit-for-tat game (Axelrod, 1984) .
Indirect Reciprocity. This represents a variation on direct reciprocity. It is unrealistic to expect that the only route to reciprocity is when two people involved in one opportunity after another to cooperate or defect when there will be others in a society who might engage in cooperative behavior even if they do not know the individual with whom they interact. Humans give donations to individuals and groups whom they do not know. We will often help strangers in need, including "Good Samaritan" behavior (e.g., see Strate, 2003) . Direct reciprocity cannot explain this. However, this would illustrate indirect reciprocity in action.
As Nowak puts it (2006): Helping someone establishes a good reputation, which will be rewarded by others. When deciding how to act, we take into account the possible consequences for our reputation. A simple rule has developed to explain how indirect reciprocity can occur: If knowing someone's reputation for reciprocity and being willing to help them exceeds the cost to benefit ratio of the altruistic act, then a person is apt to reach out to help the person with a good reputation. Hence, one example of indirect reciprocity.
Network Reciprocity. This perspective begins with the observation that (Nowak, 2013 : page 104) "some individuals interact more often than others." Evolutionary graph theory can be used to assess the consequences of how spatial population structures can affect evolutionary processes. On the face of it, it would seem that defectors would do better than cooperators.
Group Selection. In one of his last works, a key architect of the modern Neodarwinian theory, Ernst Mayr, speaks of group selection with respect to cooperation thus (2001: 131): "Members of such groups cooperate by warning of enemies, sharing newly discovered sources of food, and joint defense against enemies. This cooperative behavior enhances the survival propensity of such a group." Thus, he concludes, social behavior-such as cooperation-can be selected for at the group level. What is the group? A key question and one that has engendered much discussion. Some prefer to speak of multi-level selection, noting that selection can occur at different levels beyond the individual (on group selection generally, see such works as Sober and Wilson, 1998; Gould, 2002) . Even Darwin himself spoke, in general terms, of group selection (Darwin, 1874) . As noted earlier, Peter Corning has also addressed the socio-political implications of group selection (Corning, 2011) .
While many mainstream evolutionary theorists have developed arguments that counter group selection (e.g., Williams, 1966; Hamilton, 1964; Dawkins, 1976) , there do appear circumstances in which group selection can occur (and see E. O. Wilson, 1975) . Many of the arguments that address group selection are as much critiques of specific theoretical perspectives (such as Wynne-Edwards, 1962) as assertions that group selection cannot occur.
The above discussion of five approaches to explaining cooperation from an evolutionary perspective does not do full justice to the issues involved. Interested readers might wish to explore a larger literature (e.g., Nowak, 2006 Nowak, , 2011 Boyd, 2006; Boyd and Mathew, 2007; Benkler, 2011; Huck and Oechssler, 1999; Gintis et al., 2008; Nowak and Coakley, 2013) . There has also been some evidence that cooperative behavior is heritable (Cesarini et al., 2008) .
Neuroimaging and Political Behavior
Students of politics have long tried to understand the role of the brain in political thinking and behavior. In the 1970s, surrogate measures such as galvanic skin response (assessing emotional responsiveness, in which the brain has a key role) were used (e.g., Tursky, Lodge, and Reeder, 1979 ; see also Oxley et al., 2008) . Eye blink amplitude has been deployed (e.g., see Oxley et al., 2008) . Later, the EEG was used as a tool (e.g., Boudreau, Coulson, and McCubbins, 2008; Giuseffi, 2012; Amodio, Jost, Master, and Yee, 2007) . Currently, an important technique being used is functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) (although some researchers have employed structural MRI instead, such as Kanai, Feilden, Firth, and Rees, 2011) .
fMRI is a noninvasive instrument for assessing brain activity. It is used to show how the brain works under different situations. When placed in a strong magnetic field, hydrogen nuclei respond. When, then, a radio frequency pulse (RF) is emitted, a weak Magnetic Resonance (MR) signal is produced. This signal represents increased activity in a particular brain region, detectable by the instrumentation of the fMRI unit. With fMRI, blood flow changes are critical, and these changes can be mapped. A traditional approach to fMRI studies is to assess brain activity by comparing a normal resting state (although, as we shall note below, this is an issue that can be a bit thorny) with some sort of stimulus. The activation of greater blood flow by the stimulus can then be compared with the resting state to discern which parts of the brain have been "triggered" by this event (for an accessible description, see http://fmri.ucsd.edu/Research/whatisfmri.html).
This technique has been used to study brain responses to political stimulation. Indeed, stories of the linkage between the brain and political thinking have appeared in the mass media (e.g., Mooney, 2013) . This technology is now being presented to larger audiences. Drew Westen (2008) has also authored a volume aimed at a mass audience in which he suggests how the structure of the human brain can affect political decision making by people. In the process, he mentions the use of neuroimaging. The key questions? What has it contributed to our understanding of political phenomena? What are the questions about the fMRI technology being applied to politics? What are the implications of this debate?
One study explored the relationship of brain response to risk taking and political views (ascertained by party registration information) (Schreiber, et al., 2013) . Thus, the study evaluates whether Rs and Ds have different brain responses to risky decision making (winning a small amount as guaranteed versus winning a larger amount, but with the risk that one will gain nothing). fMRI results suggest that different regions of the brain are activated for Republicans (right amygdala) as compared to Democrats (left posterior insula). These differences in activation accurately predicted the partisanship of 82.9% of respondents.
Westen and colleagues (Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, and Hamann, 2006 ) explored what brain regions were involved in "motivated reasoning" of candidates during the 2004 presidential election. Motivated reasoning (Westen et al., 2006 (Westen et al., : 1947 ". . .can be referred to as a form of implicit affect regulation in which the brain converges on solutions that minimize negative and maximize positive affect states." There were thirty subjects-half Republicans and half Democrats. A key approach is to provide the subjects with a statement by a candidate (e.g., John Kerry in 1996 saying that Social Security should be overhauled), then a contradictory statement from the same person (e.g., Kerry later saying that he would never cut benefits). Finally, an explanation for the contradiction-in this case, experts suggesting that Social Security would stay viable years after 1996.
The contradiction, if by one's favored candidate, led to a pattern of activation, consistent with a sense of emotional threat. The following areas within the brain responded: medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate gyrus, precuneous, inferior parietal cortex, and so on. When the exculpatory explanation was provided, activation occurred in the left lateral inferior frontal cortex and left insula, consistent with processing negative affect. Also involved inferior orbital prefrontal cortex and suggestive of emotional processing. Involved, too, was the precuneus, indicating evaluative judgments. Other findings indicated that (2006: 1953) ". . .motivated reasoning did not differentially engage regions previously linked with conscious attempts to reason, suppress information, or regulate affect." The motivated reasoning seemed to operate separately from the complex supporting reasoning when there was not a great deal at stake (for other illustrations of using fMRI to study political attitudes, see Gozzi, Zamboni, Krueger, and Grafman, 2010; Knutson, Wood, Spampinato, and Grafman, 2006; Kato, Ide, Kabashima, Kadota, Takano, and Kansaku, 2009; Schreiber and Iacobini, 2012) .
However, there are also a series of questions about the method (for a depiction of very technical issues, such as resolution, sensitivity, and interpretation see Bendettini, 2009) . One apparent problem is sample size. Because of the cost and time of using fMRI, studies are often focused on a small number of people (e.g., 30 in the Westen et al. essay) . This obviously introduces threats to external validity.
Second, as Bendettini puts it (2009: 31) : "'What can fMRI, or more generally, neuroimaging, contribute to our pursuit of an understanding of thinking?' Does it really help us to look into the brain?" He notes that the images received from fMRI are only showing us one small component of understanding and thinking. He contends that we need to develop testable models of thinking. In such a context neuroimaging could be an important method for testing such models and resultant hypotheses.
A third issue is that the use of blood flow is "sluggish." Actual brain activation works very quickly, and blood flow is not able to capture this. Also, Nicholson (2006) notes that there are interconnected and numerous brain centers involved in information processing, decision making, and responses to stimuli. It is difficult to capture that complexity with fMRI technology.
Another caveat (see Robinson, 2004) . . . . The smallest area discernible by fMRI is referred to as a voxel-and voxels capture the activity of tens of thousands of neurons. Breaking down the process of neuronal responsiveness is, as a result, compromised because of the current inability to do a more fine grained analysis.
Satel and Lilienfeld 2013) point out that single brain structures (e.g., the amygdala) perform many functions, so that (page 13) "one to one mapping between a given region and a particular mental state is nearly impossible." Many who use, neuroimaging, they note, oversimplify how the brain works and the challenges of interpreting images. Studies noted above tend to be cautious and sensible in interpretation, but there are times when stories make a splash in the media and seem to be subject to Satel's and Lilienfeld's criticisms.
Final Thoughts
This paper has had a single goal: to demonstrate that there are some serious disagreements (theoretical and methodological) among those studying the linkage between biology and politics. We have simply noted that there are issues at stake here. We look forward to continuing discussion on these subjects to see where such debate and scientific findings will take us.
Some of the debates are theoretical, such as the level at which evolution operates or the roots of altruism. The main lesson, of course, is that the outcome of these debates has considerable relevance for our understanding of political phenomena. Other disagreements have both theoretical and methodological components such as molecular genetics and twin studies and the use of fMRI technology.
Students of biopolitics need to be aware of the debates and discussion and be informed consumers of the literature being generated and, when doing research, being sensitive to the issues involved in debate.
